The Administrative Search from Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment by Searle, Lynn S.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 16
Number 2 Winter 1989 Article 4
1-1-1989
The Administrative Search from Dewey to Burger:
Dismantling the Fourth Amendment
Lynn S. Searle
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lynn S. Searle, The Administrative Search from Dewey to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth Amendment, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261
(1989).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol16/iss2/4
The ""Administrative" Search from Dewey
to Burger: Dismantling the Fourth
Amendment
Introduction
As the Supreme Court has expressed, "[T]he overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State."' The Court has also noted that the
"basic purpose of this Amendment... is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government offi-
cials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right
of the people which 'is basic to a free society.' "2 Generally speaking, a
search of one's person, home, or belongings without consent3 is unconsti-
tutional if conducted without a warrant. The Warrant Clause dictates
that a warrant be issued on probable cause by a neutral magistrate and
that it specifically define the scope and objects of the search.
The natural rights foundation for the warrant requirement has not
protected the right from erosion, however, and various exceptions to the
warrant requirement have been carved out over the years. One of these
allows warrantless administrative searches of "pervasively regulated
businesses" conducted pursuant to a statutory scheme.4 The Court has
1. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), cited in 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.1(a), at 600 (1987). The Fourth
Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 27 (1949)); see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349 (1974) (consistent "with the aims of a free and open society," the Fourth Amendment
protects privacy and freedom, and the purpose of the amendment is "squarely to control the
police").
3. Numerous theories exist regarding what constitutes a valid consent. At one end of the
spectrum is a loose standard of implied consent, see infra note 36; at the other is the idea that a
valid consent would entail a Miranda-type warning. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973), the Court ruled that consent is voluntary as long as it is free from coercion, even
though the person whose premises are being searched does not know she is free to refuse entry.
For a discussion of implied consent, see infra note 36. See also Justice Douglas' dissent in
.Biswell, quoted infra at note 44.
4. According to the Court, such businesses include the liquor industry, Colonnade Ca-
tering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); the sale of firearms, United States v. Biswell,
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justified this exception on the grounds that routine searches are necessary
to make the governmental regulation effective, that they are minimally
intrusive, and that in the context of a regulated business the
owner/operator has a reduced expectation of privacy.'
In Donovan v. Dewey,6 the Court held constitutional the inspection
scheme pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1975
(MSHA).7 In so doing it identified standards and delineated specific cri-
teria to determine the constitutionality of warrantless searches. First, a
warrantless search is reasonable only when "necessary to further a regu-
latory scheme";' that is, when a warrant requirement would frustrate the
scheme. Second, in order to justify entry without a warrant, there must
be a "substantial federal interest" 9 that outweighs the individual's pri-
vacy interest. Third, for a warrantless search to be constitutional, the
statutory inspection program must provide a "constitutionally adequate
substitute"10 for a warrant. The Dewey Court characterized such a
scheme as one whereby the statute (a) specifically defines the frequency
of the inspections, (b) specifically sets forth the standards for compliance
with the regulations, and (c) prohibits forcible entries and provides a
mechanism for accommodating any specific privacy concerns the person
whose premises are to be searched might have.
The Court was recently called upon in New York v. Burger to de-
cide the constitutionality of a warrantless inspection statute that author-
ized the New York police to conduct warrantless searches of vehicle
dismantlers and junk yards in order to uncover stolen car parts. 12
Although the Court in Burger purported to be applying Dewey standards
for warrantless administrative searches, it did not; it facially applied the
standards by averring that New York's need to search was "substantial"
and that the statutory inspection scheme provided a "constitutionally ad-
equate substitute" for a warrant. But the Burger Court failed to test the
New York statute against Dewey criteria. This sort of "adjudication by
406 U.S. 311 (1972); mining, Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 593 (1981); and vehicle disman-
tling, New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
5. See New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
6. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
7. 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976 & Supp. III, 1979).
8. 452 U.S. at 600.
9. Id. at 602.
10. Id. at 603. Arguably, no such thing as a "constitutionally adequate substitute" for a
warrant exists; either a search meets the fourth amendment standard of a warrant issued on
probable cause or it doesn't. This Note assumes, however, that warrantless administrative
inspections may be constitutional and asks what standards and criteria should be applied in
such cases.
11. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
12. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986).
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slogan"13 has yielded standards that significantly dilute those applied in
Dewey, placing in serious doubt the continued existence of protections
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment in the business context.
Burger radically departed from established limits of fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence in two respects: first, searches under both the statute
and the New York City Charter14 unabashedly crossed the line between
administrative and criminal searches;"5 second, searches under the New
York statute were offensive from a purely administrative standpoint be-
cause New York failed to show the necessity for dispensing with a war-
rant requirement, the government's need to search was not sufficient by
13. Professor W. LaFave used this phrase to describe the Court's ruling in Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), concerning a voluntary consent search. The Court there
concluded that businesspeople in two prior cases, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), had "in effect" con-
sented to warrantless inspections of their business premises because they knew in advance
detailed information regarding the government's inspection powers. Yet, the Court found,
Barlow (who ran an electrical and plumbing business subject to Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) inspections) had not consented to warrantless searches under OSHA sim-
ply by conducting a business that affected interstate commerce and was thus subject to govern-
mental regulation. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 63941.
14. The Charter authorizes the commissioner of the Police Department to conduct inspec-
tions of "all licensed and unlicensed pawnbrokers, vendors, junkshop keepers, junk boatmen,
cartmen, dealers in second-hand merchandise and auctioneers... in connection with... any
police duties [and] to examine such persons, their clerks and employees and their books, busi-
ness premises, and any articles of merchandise in their possession." NEW YORK CrrY CHAR-
TER § 436 (Supp. 1985). Failure to comply with any provision of the relevant section is a
crime punishable by a fine and/or imprisonment. Id.
15. Indeed, New York's highest court struck down both the statute and the charter as
unconstitutional because
they authorize searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not
to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The asserted 'administrative
schemes' here are, in reality, designed simply to give the police an expedient means of
enforcing penal sanctions for possession of stolen property. Furthermore, an other-
wise invalid search of private property is not rendered reasonable merely because it is
authorized by a statute, for to so hold would allow legislative bodies to override the
constitutional protections against unlawful searches.
People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 493 N.E.2d, 926, 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (1986).
The United States Supreme Court reversed, rationalizing its result by ruling that
a State can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme
and through penal sanctions....
So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered
illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for
violations other than those created by the scheme itself.
107 S. Ct. at 2649, 2651 (emphasis in original). While this aspect of the Court's holding is of
supreme importance to fourth amendment jurisprudence-indeed, it carries complex and far-
reaching implications for criminal procedure-it is beyond the scope of this Note, which fo-
cuses on the warrantless administrative search.
On the evolution of and differences between standards applied in administrative and crim-
inal searches, see Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93
YALE L.J. 1127 (1984); Kress & lannelli, Administrative Search and Seizure: Whither The
Warrant?, 31 VILL. L. REv. 705 (1986). See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 1.
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Dewey standards to outweigh the individual's privacy interest, and the
regulatory scheme outlined in the statute failed to provide a constitution-
ally adequate substitute for a warrant. 16
Part I of this note outlines the background of the administrative
search and examines the warrant requirement for such searches. It also
analyzes standards and tests the Court applied prior to Dewey in the con-
text of warrantless administrative inspections of businesses subject to
"pervasive" governmental regulation. Part II examines the Court's treat-
ment of the warrantless administrative search in Dewey and its develop-
ment of a "constitutionally adequate substitute" for a warrant in the
administrative context. Part III analyzes the Court's treatment of the
warrantless administrative search of "pervasively regulated businesses"
in New York v. Burger. Part IV offers suggestions for future analyses to
meet constitutional standards.
I. Background of the Administrative Search
The individual's privacy interest lies at the core of fourth amend-
ment protections.1 7 Until 1967, however, the Fourth Amendment pro-
16. It is with this aspect of the Court's holding that this Note is concerned. Assuming,
arguendo, that warrantless administrative searches can be constitutional and that a line can
and ought to be drawn between the administrative and criminal aspects of the type of search at
issue in Burger, that is, one pursuant to a regulatory scheme whose purpose is to deter criminal
behavior, the "standards" outlined in Burger for warrantless administrative searches go far
beyond the limits of Dewey and Dewey's predecessors.
17. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), held constitutional on a consent theory a
warrantless inspection of locked business premises, see infra notes 18 & 36. Justice Frank-
furter's dissent offered a brief history behind the rationale of the Fourth Amendment, which
grew out of the Colonists' hatred of writs of assistance and the general warrant, pursuant to
which government agents had blanket authority to search one's home or business without
particularized suspicion:
Indeed, so unhappy was the experience with police search for papers and articles
"in home or office,".., that it was once maintained that no search and seizure is
valid. To Lord Coke has been attributed the proposition that warrants could not be
secured even for stolen property.... Under early English doctrine even search war-
rants by appropriate authority could issue only for stolen goods. Certainly warrants
lacking strict particularity as to location to be searched or articles to be seized were
deemed obnoxious .... An attempt to exceed these narrow limits called forth the
enduring judgment of Lord Camden... in favor of freedom against police intrusions.
And when appeal to the colonial courts on behalf of these requisite safeguards for the
liberty of the people failed .... a higher tribunal resolved the issue. The familiar
comment of John Adams on Otis' argument in Paxton's Case can never become stale:
"American independence was then and there born; the seeds of patriots and heroes
were then and there sown, to defend the rigorous youth, the non sine Dils animosus
infans. Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready
to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene of the first
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born. In fifteen years, namely in 1776, he grew up to manhood,
and declared himself free." ...
Madison and his collaborators . . . wrote that experience into the Fourth
Amendment, not merely its words. Mention has been made of the doubt in the
[Vol. 16:261
tected the individual's privacy interest only against searches for evidence
of crime. Few challenges to civil inspections arose, and when they did,
the Court concluded that no fourth amendment violation had occurred.
18
minds of English and Colonial libertarians whether searches and seizures could be
sanctioned even by search warrants. It is significant that Madison deemed it neces-
sary to put into the Fourth Amendment a qualifying permission for search and
seizure by the judicial process of the search warrant-a search warrant exacting in its
foundation and limited in scope. This qualification gives the key to what the framers
had in mind by prohibiting "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The principle was
that all seizures without judicial authority were deemed "unreasonable." If the pur-
pose of its framers is to be respected, the meaning of the Fourth Amendment must be
distilled from contemporaneous history. The intention of the Amendment was accu-
rately elucidated in an early Massachusetts case. The court there had before it the
terms of the Massachusetts Constitution, on which... the Fourth Amendment was
[partly] based:
"With the fresh recollection of those stirring discussions [respecting writs of
assistance], and of the revolution which followed them, the article in the Bill of
Rights, respecting searches and seizures, was framed and adopted. This article
does not prohibit all searches and seizures of a man's person, his papers, and
possessions; but such only as are 'unreasonable,' and the foundation of which is
'not previously supported by oath or affirmation.' ... "
Beginning with the first Congress down to 1917, Congress authorized search by
warrant not as a generally available resource in aid of criminal prosecution but in the
most restricted way, observing with a jealous eye the recurrence of evils with which
our early statesmen were intimately familiar. For each concrete situation Congress
deemed it necessary to pass a separate act.... Not until 1917, and then only after
repeated demands by the Attorney General, did Congress pass the present statute
authorizing the issue of search warrants for generalized situations.... Even then the
situations were restricted and the scope of the authority was strictly defined.
Id. at 603-06 (1946) (Frankfiurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
18. In Davis the Court upheld a warrantless entry of a gas station owner's locked office to
inspect gas ration coupons that the owner was required by law to make available for inspec-
tion. Interestingly, the Court ruled that the authority for the search was not a statute, but the
owner's consent, even though it was "given" only after the arresting agents attempted entry
through a window. The majority concluded, "We . . affirm the judgment below without
reaching the question whether but for that consent the search and seizure incidental to the
arrest were reasonable." Id. at 594. As LaFave notes, "Tis rather curious result left un-
resolved the basic question of when a warrantless inspection of a business was constitutionally
permissible.. . ." 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(a), at 631.
In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Court upheld the entry into Frank's
basement by a Baltimore health inspector who suspected a rat infestation. The majority con-
cluded that since the search was regulatory rather than criminal, it "touch[ed] at most upon
the periphery" of Frank's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 367. It also accepted the argu-
ments that administrative inspections are "designed to make the least possible demand on the
individual," id., and that the warrant process is not suited to regulatory searches, since a mag-
istrate could only rubber-stamp administrative warrants.
Frank was expressly overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531-34
(1967). See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), provided at least partial answers to the
questions left open in Davis. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. In 1978 the Court
observed unequivocally:
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately
preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt
by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for
compliance with the'several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the
colonists. "[Ihe Fourth Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the
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A. Camara and See
In 1967 the Court decided two cases that acknowledged that the
Fourth Amendment does protect the individual's privacy in the context
of civil searches, In Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,19 a
case concerning a building code inspection of residential premises, the
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the individual's
privacy interest in the context of administrative inspections as well as
criminal searches. It ruled that an apartment resident could not consti-
tutionally be convicted for refusing entry to a building code inspector
without a warrant.
The Court determined that since an administrative search was less
intrusive than a search conducted to uncover evidence of a crime, the
search could be conducted on less than probable cause, as long as it was
reasonable. According to the Camara Court, administrative searches are
reasonable when the government's need to enforce administrative regula-
tions outweighs the limited intrusiveness of such a noncriminal search.
The Court considered three factors: a long history of judicial and public
acceptance of this type of search; a public interest in preventing or abat-
ing all dangerous conditions, coupled with the fact that no other effective
way existed to enforce the regulatory scheme; and that the inspections
were neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of evidence of
crime.2' But the-Court held that the individual's privacy interest none-
theless required a warrant issued by a disinterested party.21 In See v. City
of Seattle,22 a companion case to Camara, the Court concluded that the
protection of this privacy interest also applied to commercial premises.
In reversing the conviction of Mr. See for refusing to permit an officer of
Seattle's Fire Department to enter his locked commercial warehouse
without a warrant, the majority stated unequivocally:
The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitu-
tional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official
entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman,
colonists' experience with the writs of assistance... [that] granted sweeping power to
customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods."
. . Against this background, it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was
not intended to shield places of business as well as of residence.
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1977)) (footnotes and other citations omitted).
19. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
20. Id. at 537.
21. In response to the assertion in Camara that "public interest demands that all danger-
ous conditions be prevented or abated," 387 U.S. at 537, LaFave remarks:
[I]t is difficult to accept that [100 per cent enforcement can justify] a diluted probable
cause test. One might as cogently argue that there is a need for universal compliance
with the criminal law .... [I]nstead we are committed to a philosophy tolerating a
certain level of undetected crime as preferable to an oppressive police state.
3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.1(b), at 604.
22. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and
inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced
by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by
[a] warrant.23
Thus, the general rule became that, absent consent, a warrant was consti-
tutionally required to conduct administrative inspections.2 4
B. Exceptions to the Administrative Warrant Requirement
Since Camara and See, an exception to the administrative warrant
requirement has been recognized for inspections of businesses subject to
close governmental regulation. In its struggle to find authority and artic-
ulate rationales for warrantless searches, the Court has been unsuccessful
in developing and defining consistent criteria. Its decisions, neither com-
prehensive nor far-seeing, have dealt with cases on an ad hoc basis. Con-
sequently, criteria have evolved as new questions have arisen, and no
overriding theory or interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has
emerged. Most of the cases prior to Dewey deal with the rationales and
criteria enumerated here, however, even if they are not articulated as
such.
The Court'has found authority for warrantless searches in the doc-
trine of implied consent,2 5 a long history of governmental supervision,26
and regulatory statutes that provide for governmental inspection. It
has justified such searches on the basis of need, reasoning that when sur-
prise or immediacy is essential, the warrant requirement would frustrate
the objectives of the regulatory scheme.2" The Court has also employed
23. Id. at 543.
24. Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313
(1978); see Stewart's dissent in Donovan v. Dewey:
In [Barlow's] the Court made clear that Colonnade and Biswell were only limited
exceptions to the general rule of Camara [that a warrantless inspection by municipal
administrative officers without proper consent is unconstitutional "unless it has been
authorized by a valid search warrant," 387 U.S. at 529], and that they did not signal
a trend away from that rule. The Court stated that "unless some recognized excep-
tion to the warrant requirement applies," warrants for administrative inspections are
mandatory.
452 U.S. 594, 610 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313).
25. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 313 (1978); infra note 36.
26. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
27. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1979).
28. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316; Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603. The rationale for the notice
given under these circumstances is that the inspecting agent's presence constitutes much less of
an invasi6n of privacy if those whose places are to be searched know when the agent will
inspect. Thus the administrative warrant differs from the search warrant, which issues ex
parte, that is, without notice to or contest by any party adversely interested. Administrative
warrants, however, may nonetheless be considered to issue ex parte in the sense that those
whose premises will be searched have no opportunity to contest the issuing of the warrant or
the search itself.
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various balancing tests that weigh the government's interests against the
individual's privacy interest. Governmental interests found to justify a
warrantless search include a federal interest in protecting revenue 9 and
an "urgent federal interest" in controlling firearms.30
L The Colonnade-Biswell Doctrine
In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States31 the Court found no
constitutional violation in a warrantless search of a catering establish-
ment licensed to serve alcoholic beverages. The Court identified a federal
interest "in protecting the revenue against various types of fraud," noting
that "Congress has broad power to design such powers of inspection
under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand."32
In making this determination, the Court relied exclusively on the long
tradition of regulation of the liquor industry.3
In United States v. Biswell,34 the Court deemed constitutional a war-
rantless search of a pawnshop pursuant to the Gun Control Act of
1968. 31 The Court noted that "[i]n the context of a regulatory inspection
system of business premises... the legality of the search depends not on
consent3 6 but on the authority of a valid statute., 37 It found that "in-
29. Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 75.
30. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317.
31. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
32. Id. at 76.
33. Id. at 76, 77. The Court nonetheless disallowed the warrantless search in Colonnade,
on grounds that while Congress had the power to fashion laws that would allow such a search,
in this case it had provided another, exclusive remedy, one that "does not include forcible
entries without a warrant," id. at 77. The statute provided a civil penalty of up to $500 for
refusal of the search. 26 U.S.C. § 7342 (1954).
34. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
35. The Act provides in pertinent part:
The Secretary [of the Treasury] may enter during business hours the premises (in-
cluding places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition ... dealer... for the
purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents ... and (2) any
firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such... dealer... at such premises.
18 U.S.C. § 923(g).
36. In the context of pervasively regulated businesses and the exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the Court has justified warrantless intrusions on the individual's privacy under
two theories based on notice to that individual of the search.
The first of these, the implied consent theory, reasons that when a businessperson acquires
a license and commences business in an industry subject to federal regulation, the owner is
notified of the regulations necessitating periodic inspections; thus, in entering the business, the
operator "in effect consents to" the searches inherent in the regulatory scheme. Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266, 271 (1973)); see also 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 639-40. The Barlow's
majority remarked, "[W]hen an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has volunta-
rily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation." 436 U.S. at 313.
The Barlow's Court disallowed warrantless searches under OSHA, noting that warrantless
searches of a closely regulated industry of the Colonnade-Biswell type are the exception, not
the rule. The Court was not persuaded by the argument "that all businesses involved in inter-
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spections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited
threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy, "38 reasoning,
state commerce have long been subjected to close supervision of employee safety and health
conditions," id. at 314, such that they are all subject to warrantless inspection.
The second theory posits that since the owner/operator of a pervasively regulated busi-
ness knows beforehand that regulatory inspections will occur, he or she has a reduced expecta-
tion of privacy in those premises. See Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313 ("Certain industries have such
a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ... could exist
over the stock of such an enterprise." (citations omitted)).
Most of the pre-Biswell inspection cases were decided on the implied consent theory. 3
W. LAFAvF, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 639 (citing Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative
Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341, 362
(1975)), As LaFave notes, it is a theory related to the "conditioned privilege" app'roach, which
"rest[s] upon the proposition that the granting of the license is a privilege to which the state
may constitutionally attach the prerequisite that the licensee submit to warrantless no-prob-
able-cause inspections." 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 638.
Neither of these rationales justifies the warrantless search. First, the state may not grant a
"privilege"-the privilege to do business, for example--conditioned on the citizen's giving up a
right guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 639
(citing United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 282 U.S. 311 (1931)). As LaFave
points out:
[A] particular inspection scheme is not entitled to be conclusively presumed valid
under the Fourth Amendment merely because it is directed toward businesses li-
censed by or contracting with the government, any more than an inspection scheme
directed at a business not in such a relationship is to be conclusively presumed
invalid.
3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 639. Second, the implied consent theory is equally
flawed in that "the courts imply a consent to search which was never in fact given." 3 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 640. This argument becomes particularly apparent in
cases in which the regulatory statute authorizing warrantless searches also provides a penalty
for refusing entry to inspecting agents. Such statutes include those at issue in Camara, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), Colonnade, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), and New York
v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987). One who is required to undergo a search on pain of fine or
penalty can hardly be said to have consented freely-either expressly or impliedly-to the
search. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 639-41. See also Justice Douglas' dissent
in Biswell, quoted infra at note 44.
The dissenters in Barlow's point out the logical inconsistency of the majority's treatment
of the consent argument:
In the Court's view, . . .businesses [engaged in the liquor and firearms industry]
consent to the restrictions placed upon them, while it would be fiction to conclude
that a businessman subject to OSHA consented to routine safety inspections. In fact,
however, consent is fictional in both contexts. Here, as well as in Biswell, businesses
are required to be aware of and comply with regulations governing their business
activities. In both situations, the validity of the regulations depends not upon the con-
sent of those regulated, but on the existence of a federal statute embodying a congres-
sional determination that the public interest in the health of the Nation's work force
or the limitation of illegal firearms traffic outweighs the businessman's interest in
preventing a government inspector from viewing those areas of his premises which
relate to the subject matter of the regulation.
436 U.S. at 338 (emphasis added); see 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 640 (discussing
the relative merits of consent arguments).
37. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
38. Id. at 316.
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When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated busi-
ness and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge
that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject
to effective inspection.... The dealer is not left to wonder about
the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.3 9
The Court here suggests that because the dealer has impliedly consented,
the scope of the search is limited. This analysis is confusing because it
fails to distinguish the discrete elements of the Warrant Clause and their
respective functions. The Warrant Clause mandates criteria for both en-
try (probable cause) and limiting the scope of the search (the particular-
ity requirement); it further guarantees these protections by providing
that a warrant will not issue unless a neutral party has determined that
these requirements have been met. Assuming that the regulatory statute
provides constitutional grounds for entry (for example, a Camara-type
"flexible" probable cause°), this alone does not guarantee that the scope
of the inspection falls within constitutional bounds. That a statute pre-
sumably informs the dealer of the purpose and limits of a search fails to
guarantee that those limits are sufficiently narrow. The Biswell analysis
falls short because it fails to make this necessary distinction, although the
inspection scheme under the Gun Control Act might in fact have been
sufficiently limited.41
The Biswell Court found the inspection reasonable and asserted that
even though federal regulation of the firearms industry was "not as
deeply rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry,
... close scrutiny of this traffic is undeniably of central importance to
federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulat-
ing the firearms traffic within their borders."'42 The Court held that
"where, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest[s],
and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impres-
sive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a warrant where
specifically authorized by statute."'43
The first prong of the Biswell test addresses the government's need
to dispense with a warrant when the federal need is urgent, but the regu-
latory scheme cannot meet the Colonnade long-history-of-supervision
test.' The second prong addresses not only individual privacy interests,
39. Id. at 316. Regarding the implied consent rationale implicit in the Court's reasoning,
see supra note 36.
40. See infra note 45.
41. See infra pp. 290-91.
42. Id. at 315.
43. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
44. As the Court later noted in Donovan v. Dewey:
[I]f the length of regulation were the only criterion, absurd results would occur.
Under [this] view, new or emerging industries, including ones such as the nuclear
power industry that pose enormous potential safety and health problems, could never
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but also the particularity requirement of the Warrant Clause.4" Of im-
portance here is that the Biswell balancing test requires an urgent federal
interest in order to overcome a threat to privacy "not of impressive
dimensions. ' 46
The Court in Biswell distinguished See v. City of Seattle47 by point-
ing out that See concerned building code inspections designed to correct
"conditions ... relatively difficult to conceal or to correct in a short
time." Thus a warrant requirement posed "little if any threat to the ef-
fectiveness of the inspection system there at issue."'48 By contrast, the
Court found that "[h]ere, if inspection is to be effective and serve as a
credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essen-
tial."49 The Court did not elaborate concerning why warrantless inspec-
tions were necessary, but merely asserted that "[i]n this context, the
prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection; and if the nec-
essary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to be preserved, the
protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible." 50 Ostensibly, un-
be subject to warrantless searches even under the most carefully structured inspec-
tion program simply because of the recent vintage of regulation.
452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
But compare Justice Douglas' dissent in Biswell:
The Court legitimates this inspection scheme because of its belief that, had respon-
dent been a dealer in liquor instead of firearms, such a search as was here undertaken
would have been valid under the principles of Colonnade. I respectfully disagree....
[A]ssuming, arguendo, that the firearms industry is as appropriate a subject of perva-
sive governmental inspection as is the liquor industry, the Court errs....
Here, the statute authorizing inspection is virtually identical to the one we con-
sidered in Colonnade. The conclusion necessarily follows that Congress, as in Colon-
nade, has here "selected a standard that does not include forcible entries without a
warrant." . . .
In my view, a search conducted over the objection of the owner of the premises
sought to be searched is "forcible," whether or not violent means are used to effect
the search....
[Quoting Justice Stewart in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550
(1968)] "When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search.
The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where
there is coercion there cannot be consent."
406 U.S. at 318-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. The Biswell Court did not address the issue of probable cause, perhaps because in
relying on a Camara-type balancing test, the Court impliedly substituted the balancing test for
probable cause as its grounds for entry. Yet a distinction worth making, and one that the
Court in Camara did make, is that the absence of the need for traditional probable cause does
not dispense with the need for a warrant and a magistrate's neutral determination.
46. 406 U.S. at 317. This two-prong test appears in a refined form in Dewey, 452 U.S. 594
(1981). See infra pp. 273-78.
47. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
48. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Court here seems to confuse the necessity for proceeding without a warrant
(when to obtain one would frustrate the regulatory scheme) with the purpose the warrant
serves. The warrant itself is important because it provides a neutral magistrate rather than an
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registered or otherwise illegal firearms could easily be disposed of if the
shop owner were on notice that an inspection would be conducted. The
Court here did not consider the feasibility of warrants issued ex parte.
The Colonnade-Biswell exception thus laid the foundation for an ex-
ception to the administrative warrant requirement, but it was the first-
not the last-word on the subject. While Biswell established that the
authority for a warrantless inspection was "a valid statute," it left open
the question what criteria the inspection statute had to meet to be consid-
ered constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
C. The Constitutional Question
The question of the validity of a warrantless inspection scheme came
directly before the Court when it was called upon in Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc. "1 to decide the constitutionality of the inspection provisions of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).52 While in
Barlow's the Court did not further develop specific criteria for constitu-
tional warrantless administrative inspections, the Court certainly aided
the development of such criteria in detailing its rationale for holding un-
constitutional the OSHA scheme.
Citing Camara and See, the Barlow's Court reiterated that warrant-
less searches are presumptively unreasonable.53 It also emphasized the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment "to safeguard the privacy and secur-
ity of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." 4
The Court rejected the Secretary of Labor's argument that OSHA
inspections fell under the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant re-
quirement "for 'pervasively regulated business[es]' and for 'closely regu-
lated' industries 'long subject to close supervision and inspection,' "I'
finding that regulation under OSHA was not pervasive enough to justify
a warrantless inspection.
The Court also disagreed with the Secretary of Labor's argument
that the protections afforded by an administrative warrant are "margi-
nal."5 6 On the contrary, the Court stated:
interested party to determine whether or not a particular search adheres to constitutional man-
dates. That neutral determination minimizes the discretion of investigating officers, thereby
curtailing abuse of the system. Even in a warrantless search scheme this neutral determination
function need not be sacrificed along with the warrant requirement; it may be provided for by a
statutory scheme narrowly drawn so that it outlines standardized neutral criteria for the
search, providing a "constitutionally adequate substitute" for a warrant. Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594 (1981); see infra pp. 275-78.
51. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
53. 436 U.S. at 312; see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
54. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 528).
55. Id. at 313 (citing Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316, and Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 74, 77).
56. Id. at 322.
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The authority to make warrantless searches devolves almost unbri-
dled discretion upon executive and administrative officers, particu-
larly those in the field, as to when to search and whom to search.
A warrant, by contrast, would provide assurances from a neutral
officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is
authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan
containing specific neutral criteria.57
The majority reasoned that the burden on the government of obtaining a
warrant would not be heavy enough to justify proceeding without a war-
rant; nor would such a burden significantly frustrate the regulatory
scheme's objectives. First, while the regulatory scheme might contem-
plate surprise searches because it regulates safety details "amenable to
speedy alteration or disguise,"58 most business people would consent to
the searches without a warrant.59 Second, if entry were refused, the in-
specting agent might proceed by compulsory process." Third, the Court
noted that the element of surprise would not be lost if, even after refusal,
the inspecting agent were to seek an ex parte warrant and "reappear on
the premises without further notice."61
II. Donovan v. Dewey
In Donovan v. Dewey,62 the Court held constitutional the inspection
scheme pursuant to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1975
(MSHA).63 In so doing the Court recognized the inadequacy of the ra-
tionale underlying the Colonnade test.64 Drawing heavily on Biswell and
Barlow's, the Dewey Court distilled and refined the tests previously ap-
plied to warrantless administrative inspection schemes. The Dewey test
acknowledged the need for warrantless inspections in situations of great
risk to public health and safety while also preserving the privacy protec-
tions guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
A. Threshold Concerns: Authority and Need for the Search
The Court echoed Biswell in reiterating that the authority for a war-
rantless administrative inspection derived from a valid statutory scheme.
It also noted that "the 'reasonableness of a warrantless search... will
57. Id. at 323.
58. Id. at 316.
59. The Court noted that "the great majority of businessmen can be expected in normal
course to consent to inspection without [a] warrant .... " Id.
60. Indeed, when Mr. Barlow refused entry to the inspecting agent, the Secretary of Labor
"proceeded in federal court to enforce his right to enter and inspect, as conferred by 29 U.S.C.
§ 657." Id. at 317 n.12.
61. Id. at 320.
62. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
63. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
64. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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depend upon the specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of
each statute' and that some statutes 'apply only to a single industry,
where regulations might already be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell
exception to the warrant requirement could apply.' ",65 Thus both Bis-
well and Dewey emphasize that even when an industry is closely regu-
lated, the exception to the warrant requirement will not automatically
apply, but it may apply.
In Dewey the Court did not reach the frustration of the search issue
because Congress had addressed it directly in designing the inspection
program: "[I]n [light] of the notorious ease with which many safety or
health hazards may be concealed if advance warning of inspection is ob-
tained, a warrant requirement would seriously undercut this Act's objec-
tives."' 66 Thus the Act provided that "no advance notice of an inspection
shall be provided to any person."'67 The Court found "no reason not to
defer to this legislative determination" 68 and thus did not discuss the pro-
tections that might be afforded by an ex parte warrant.69
B. The Dewey Two-Part Test for Constitutionality
Once the threshold concerns were met, the Court balanced the indi-
vidual's privacy interest against the government's need to conduct the
search. After determining that a "substantial federal interest" justified a
warrantless search, the Court then inquired whether the statutory
scheme provided a "constitutionally adequate substitute" for a warrant.
L The Balancing Test: A Substantial, Federal Interest
After finding that a warrant requirement would frustrate the MSHA
inspection scheme, the Court asked in a separate inquiry whether the
government's interest in conducting the search was sufficiently great to
outweigh individual privacy concerns. In addressing the privacy interest
at stake in administrative searches, the Dewey Court reasoned, "[T]he
expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in
such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individ-
ual's home, and.., this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances,
be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless
65. 452 U.S. at 601-02 (citing Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 603 (citing S. REP. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., Sess. 27, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3401, 3427).
67. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
68. 452 U.S. at 603.
69. This may be in part because under the regulatory scheme, a warrant would in fact
have providedfewer protections than MSHA, which required the investigator to file a civil suit
in the event entry was refused. Furthermore, because of the specificity of the statute, a deter-
mination by a neutral magistrate would have offered no more protection than was already
offered under MSHA. See infra pp. 277-78.
inspections."7 Citing both Colonnade and Biswell, the Court in Dewey
concluded that "a warrant may not be constitutionally required when
Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are neces-
sary to further a regulatory scheme .... ,71 In applying this standard to
warrantless searches under MSHA,7 2 the Dewey Court identified a
"'substantial federal interest' in improving the health and safety condi-
tions in the Nation's underground and surface mines.""
While at first glance this standard may seem diluted compared with
the "urgent need" standard of Biswell, it is by no means clear that the
Court in Dewey either meant to or did in fact dilute the Biswell balancing
standard. On the contrary, the Court termed the mining industry
"among the most hazardous in the country" and noted that in the pre-
amble to the Act Congress expressly referred to the "urgent need" to
improve health and safety conditions in the Nation's mines "in order to
prevent death and serious physical harm, and in order to prevent occupa-
tional diseases originating in such mines."'  The Court called mining
"an inherently dangerous industrial activity" toward which the statute
was "narrowly and explicitly directed. '75
2. A Constitutionally Adequate Substitute for A Warrant
Assuming that the government's need to conduct the search out-
weighs the individual's privacy interest and that warrantless searches are
necessary to further the regulatory scheme, the inspection program as
outlined in the relevant statute must provide a "constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant. '76 The Court in Dewey set forth three criteria
that rendered the MSHA inspection scheme constitutional. First, the
"Act itself clearly notifies the operator that inspections will be performed
on a regular basis."' 77 Second,
the Act and the regulations issued pursuant to it inform the opera-
tor of what ... standards must be met in order to be in compliance
with the statute. The discretion of Government officials to deter-
mine what facilities to search and what violations to search for is
thus directly curtailed by the regulatory scheme. 78
70. 452 U.S. at 598-99; see Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316. Absent consent or exigent circum-
stances, however, business premises may not be entered without a warrant either to conduct a
search or to effect an arrest when the search is intended to uncover contraband or evidence of
crime. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598 n.6.
71. 452 U.S. at 600 (emphasis added).
72. 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
73. 452 U.S. at 602.
74. Id. at 602 n.7 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 801 preamble).
75. Id.
76. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603.
77. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
78. Id.
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And third, "the statute itself embodies a means by which any special
Fourth Amendment interests can be accommodated. 7
9
a. Regular Basis Test
Regarding the first criterion, the Court observed that "the Act re-
quires inspection of all mines 'and specifically defines the frequency of
inspection."80 "Thus," the Court concluded, "rather than leaving the
frequency.., of inspections to the unchecked discretion of Government
officers, the Act establishes a predictable . . . federal regulatory pres-
ence." 81 The Court contrasted this inspection scheme with that under
OSHA in Barlow's, implying that one of the reasons the inspections at
issue in that case were unconstitutional was that OSHA "did not require
the periodic inspection of businesses ... and instead left the decision to
inspect within the broad discretion of agency officials. Thus, [under that
scheme], the owner had no indication of 'why an inspection of [his] es-
tablishment was within the program.' "82
As in Biswell, this explanation is faulty.83 A mine owner's knowl-
edge that all mining operations are subject to inspection under MSHA at
certain intervals and his understanding of the purpose of the inspec-
tions-viz., to insure the health and safety of mine workers as well as of
the public at large-no doubt serve a worthwhile purpose. The predict-
ability of the regulatory inspections provides a partial substitute for the
probable cause element of the Warrant Clause,8 4 because it is the knowl-
edge that a search cannot ordinarily be conducted without probable
cause-that is, arbitrarily or on an agent's mere suspicion-that provides
the security essential to the privacy and autonomy interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment." Such knowledge and understanding on the
79. Id. The Court here referred to Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d
589, 594 (3rd Cir. 1979) (inspectors ordered to keep confidential mine's trade secrets), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
80. 452 U.S. at 603-04 (emphasis in original). The Court summarized the frequency spe-
cifically mandated by the Act as follows:
Representatives of the Secretary [of Labor] must inspect all surface mines at least
twice annually and all underground mines at least four times annually.... Similarly,
all mining operations that generate explosive gases must be inspected at irregular 5-,
10-, or 15-day intervals.... Moreover, the Secretary must conduct followup inspec-
tions of mines where violations of the Act have previously been discovered... and
must inspect a mine immediately if notified by a miner or a miner's representative
that a violation of the Act or an imminently dangerous condition exists.
Id. at 604 (citations omitted).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 604 n.9 (citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 n.20 (1978)).
83. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
84. "[No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
85. In redefining probable cause in the context of administrative searches, the Court in
Camara noted that standards for issuing an administrative warrant
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part of the mine owner, however, do nothing to guarantee that by the
statute's terms the scope of warrantless searches is sufficiently limited.
The Dewey regular basis test helps ensure constitutionality because it
provides that inspections "will be performed," thus furnishing the neu-
trality inherent in the warrant clause protections. So under MSHA, even
though the determination to search is not made by a neutral magistrate,
it is commanded by a neutral statute, which requires that all mines be
inspected with a certain frequency. In the context of an administrative
search, the neutrality of such a predictable and consistent application,
free from any investigator's discretion, helps provide an adequate substi-
tute for a magistrate's neutral determination of probable cause.
b. Standards for Compliance
Addressing the discretion of inspecting agents, the Dewey Court
held the inspection scheme under MSHA constitutional because "the
standards with which a mine operator is required to comply are all specif-
ically set forth in the Act or in [the] Federal Regulations. Indeed, the
Act requires that the Secretary inform mine operators of all standards
proposed pursuant to the Act." 6 This provision provides a substitute for
the particularity requirement of the Warrant Clause,87 since it specifi-
cally defines and limits the scope of the inspections and thus the discre-
tion of the inspecting agents-a function that would normally be
overseen by the neutral magistrate issuing a warrant. This provision also
assures that the operator is aware of both the purposes and the limits of
the inspection, 8 a function normally fulfilled by the warrant itself.
c. Specific Mechanism for Accommodating Special Privacy Concerns
As a third and final safeguard under MSHA, the statute provided
a specific mechanism for accommodating any special privacy con-
cerns that a specific mine operator might have. The Act prohibits
forcible entries, and instead requires the Secretary, when refused
entry onto a mining facility, to fie a civil action in federal court to
obtain an injunction against future refusals. This proceeding pro-
vides an adequate forum for the mineowner to show that a specific
search is outside the federal regulatory authority, or to seek from
the district court an order accommodating any unusual privacy in-
will vary with the municipal program being enforced[; they] may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or
the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific
knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
86. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 604 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 811(e) (1969)).
87. "[N]o Warrants shall issue ... [without] particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
88. 452 U.S. at 604 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972)).
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terests that the mineowner might have.89
The Dewey Court concluded that given these three protections, "it is dif-
ficult to see what additional protection a warrant requirement would
provide."9
Indeed, a warrant, if issued ex parte, would give the mine
owner/operator no notice of the inspection, so the predictability inherent
in the statutory scheme that helps provide a measure of protection would
be missing. Also, under a warrant system the owner/operator would
have no opportunity to protect any particular privacy concerns by refus-
ing the search, since he would necessarily have to yield entry to an in-
spector with a warrant. Thus under the scheme at issue in Dewey, if a
warrant requirement were substituted for the protections offered by the
statute, it would provide the mine owner/operator with fewer
protections.
III. New York v. Burger
In People v. Burger91 the New York Court of Appeals held unconsti-
tutional the statutory inspection scheme under section 415-a5 of New
York's Vehicle and Traffic Law,92 which allowed warrantless searches of
auto dismantlers' and junk yard dealers' business premises.93 Citing to
both Dewey and Biswell, the New York court enumerated four criteria
necessary to validate a warrantless administrative inspection of commer-
cial premises: the premises must be part of a pervasively regulated indus-
try; the search must further an urgent state interest; the warrantless
search must be essential to the administrative scheme; and the inspection
must be authorized by a valid statute "carefully limited in time, place,
and scope." 94
The New York court did not analyze the inspection according to
these administrative criteria, however. It recognized the Supreme
Court's distinction between valid administrative searches and those used
to obtain evidence of crime, asserting that "an administrative search
must serve an administrative purpose; when designed instead to uncover
evidence of a crime the traditional requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment apply."95 The court found not only that the New York statute had
no administrative purpose, but also that "[t]he asserted 'administrative
schemes' here are, in reality, designed simply to give the police an expedi-
89. Id. at 604-05 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 818(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
90. Id. at 605.
91. 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d 926, 502 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1986).
92. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986).
93. The court also deemed unconstitutional § 436 of the New York City Charter, which
allowed warrantless inspection, of junkyards and other businesses that stored second-hand
merchandise.
94. 67 N.Y.2d at 343, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
95. Id. (citing Dewey, 452 U.S. at 598 & n.6, and Camara, 387 U.S. at 530, 535).
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ent means of enforcing penal sanctions for possession of stolen prop-
erty." 96 The court went on to observe that "an otherwise invalid search
of private property is not rendered reasonable merely because it is au-
thorized by a statute, for to so hold would allow legislative bodies to
override the constitutional protections against unlawful searches."
97
The United States Supreme Court reversed, 98 finding that the statu-
tory scheme did serve a legitimate administrative purpose and that the
scheme was constitutionally permissible.99
A. Threshold Concerns
Relying on the Colonnade-Biswell doctrine and on Dewey, the Court
in Burger found an "established exception to the warrant requirement for
administrative inspections in 'closely regulated' businesses."" It rea-
soned that if a business is closely regulated, the owner/operator has a
reduced expectation of privacy, which in turn automatically allows the
government to conduct a warrantless regulatory search.101 This interpre-
tation clearly contravenes both the spirit and the language of Biswell and
Dewey, threatening to make the warrantless search the rule rather than
the exception. 10 2
The Court first determined that the New York regulatory scheme
"reasonably serves the State's interest in eradicating automobile
theft."' 03 It then found warrantless inspections necessary to further the
96. Id. at 344, 493 N.E.2d at 929, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
97. Id. It also noted that "[s]ignificantly, in both [Dewey and Biswell] the administrative
statutes authorize warrantless inspections to be conducted by agents of the regulatory agency,
not police officers." Id. By contrast, the court noted, § 436 of the New York City Charter
allowed warrantless searches "in connection with the performance of any police duties." Id.
(emphasis in original). See infra notes 137-144 and accompanying text.
98. New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
99. The Burger Court also concluded that such a regulatory scheme could have both an
administrative and a criminal end, and that the concurrent intent of the statute to allow
searches for criminal evidence did not invalidate the warrantless administrative inspection
scheme.' As noted earlier, however, see supra note 15, the criminal leg of the Court's finding is
beyond the scope of this Note, which is concerned with the constitutional adequacy of § 415-
a5 under Dewey and its predecessors.
100. 107 S. Ct. at 2644 (emphasis added). See supra pp. 268-72.
101. Id. at 2643.
102. See supra note 24. In his dissent in Burger, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Mar-
shall and O'Connor, pointed out that the regulations of the vehicle dismantling business in
New York essentially required only that a vehicle dismantler obtain a license and keep a police
book. He observed that regulatory requirements ior many businesses are much more stringent.
After noting the "marked contrast" between. New York's regulations for vehicle dismantlers
and the mine safety regulations relevant in Dewey, he concluded, "[I]f New York City's admin-
istrative scheme renders the vehicle-dismantling business closely regulated, few businesses will
escape such a finding. Under these circumstances, the warrant requirement is the exception
not the rule, and See has been constructively overruled." 107 S. Ct. at 2653-54 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted).
103. 107 S. Ct. at 2647.
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scheme "[b]ecause stolen cars and parts often pass quickly through an
automobile junkyard[; thus] 'frequent' and 'unannounced' inspections are
necessary in order to detect them."" It is unclear what element of sur-
prise would be lost through the mechanism of an ex parte warrant. The
Court, citing Biswell, asserted that "the protections afforded by a warrant
would be negligible,"1°5 but the Court offered no support for this
assertion.
The Court also determined that the expectation of privacy was "par-
ticularly attenuated" in property employed in "closely regulated busi-
nesses." 1 16 The majority reasoned that "because the owner or operator
of commercial premises in a 'closely regulated' industry has a reduced
expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements10 7
... have a lessened application in this context." 108
Two problems emerge regarding the expectation of privacy argu-
ment in general and its application in the context of the pervasively regu-
lated business. First, if it is the notice provided by pervasive regulation
that reduces one's legitimate expectation of privacy, then any time notice
is given, a person's reasonable expectation of privacy diminishes, and her
fourth amendment protections evaporate. Taken to its logical extreme,
this argument asserts that any time a legislature passes a statute authoriz-
ing warrantless searches, whether constitutional or not, the public is on
notice that the searches will be made, and consequently has no reason-
able expectation of privacy.10 9 This is essentially the argument advanced
in both Biswell and Burger.
The flaw in this logic is manifest; as one commentator has noted,
according to the theory, if the government's intention is "sufficiently well
publicized, [it] colors a citizen's constitutionally cognizable privacy ex-
pectations."' 110 Certainly such a situation could not constitutionally be
tolerated. As LaFave has pointed out:
Were a municipality to inform its citizens that henceforth houses
would be searched for narcotics without warrants, the practice
would be no more proper than before the promulgation of the gov-
ernment's intention. The same result presumably would apply if
the government limited its practice to new residents, who were in-
formed of the government's plans before moving into the area. 1 '
104. Id. at 2648.
105. Id. (citing Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316).
106. Id. at 2642.
107. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
108. Id. at 2643.
109. See supra note 36.
110. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1011, 1025-26
(1973), quoted in 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 640.
111. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 10.2(c), at 640. See supra note 36.
[Vol. 16:261
Second, the reduced expectation of privacy argument confuses the
probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment with the warrant
requirement. The discussion of one's expectation of privacy is relative to
grounds for search, rather than to whether a warrant is necessary-an
important distinction. The warrant requirement allows a neutral magis-
trate to verify not only that the investigating officer has probable cause1 12
to conduct a search, but also that the particularity requirement 3 has
been satisfied in that the scope of the search is sufficiently circumscribed.
In the context of an administrative search, however, warrants issue
on less than probable cause. 1 4 The question then becomes twofold: on
what grounds (if not probable cause) may the search be conducted, and
(as a separate determination) is a warrant necessary? Regardless of the
determination concerning probable cause, an administrative warrant is
necessary unless the warrant requirement would frustrate the search and
the government's need to search is sufficiently great that it outweighs the
individual's privacy interest.'1 5 The warrant's most important function
is to put the decision regarding whether or not to conduct a search in the
hands of a neutral magistrate rather than leaving it to the discretion of
the investigating officer.
B. The Constitutionality of the Inspection Scheme
In Burger, the Court found that New York had "a substantial inter-
est"'1 6 in conducting warrantless searches pursuant to a New York stat-
ute regulating auto dismantlers and automobile junkyards, but an
analysis of the rationale behind Burger's "substantial interest" reveals
significant qualitative differences between it and the Dewey "substantial
interest" on which the Burger Court relies.
1. The Balancing Test: The Government's Substantial Interest
A significant problem arises when the reduced expectation of pri-
vacy argument is applied as it was in Burger. There the Court found that
a warrantless search may be reasonable "where the privacy interests of
the owner are weakened and the government's interests in regulating par-
ticular businesses are concomitantly heightened." ' 7 This language sug-
gests the assumption that when individual privacy interests are
weakened, the government's interests are automatically greater, which is
not the case. A balancing standard demands that the competing interests
112. "[No Warrants shall issue but upon probable case... ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
113. "[Warrants shall] particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." Id.
114. See Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
115. See id. at 533; Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Dewey, 452 U.S. 593 (1981).
116. Id. at 2646.
117. 107 S. Ct. at 2643.
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be weighed by asking whether the government's interest (whatever it is)
is strong enough to overcome individual privacy interests at stake
(whatever they are).
The "substantial interest" in Burger arose "because motor vehicle
theft has increased in the State and because the problem of theft is associ-
ated with this industry."11 The Court termed auto theft "a significant
social problem [that places] enormous economic and personal burdens"
on the citizenry; these include financial losses "in excess of $225 million"
and insurance premiums "above the national average." 11 9 Furthermore,
the Court noted, "stolen automobiles are often used in the commission of
other crimes and there is a high incidence of [auto] accidents... involv-
ing stolen cars."1 20
Problems with this rationale abound. First, if "substantial interest"
is defined by such a broad standard as "significant social problem," it
places Burger in direct conflict with the existing standard of a warrant
issued on probable cause for addressing the very significant "social prob-
lem" of crime in general, especially violent crime. In Mincey v. Ari-
zona,"'x for example, the Court disallowed a warrantless search of a
home in which a homicide was committed, noting that such a search was
not justified by the "vital public interest in the prompt investigation of
the extremely serious crime of murder."1 22 A person may have a greater
expectation of privacy in her home than in her business, but if, for exam-
ple, the search of Burger's junkyard had been pursuant to a homicide
rather than auto theft, a warrant would have been required. It is difficult
to understand how the government's interest in uncovering information
concerning stolen cars is substantial enough to justify a warrantless
search, when its interest in uncovering information about murder is
not. 123
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2647.
120. Id. (citing Governor's Message approving 1979 N.Y. LAWS 1826, 1827 (McKinney
1979)).
121. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
122. Id. at 393. Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist, who joined the majority in Burger, had
filed a concurring opinion in Dewey because he believed the warrantless inspection scheme
under MSHA unconstitutional insofar as it also permitted warrantless inspection of stone
quarries. He observed:
I have no doubt that had Congress enacted a criminal statute similar to that involved
here-authorizing, for example, unannounced warrantless searches of property rea-
sonably thought to house unlawful drug activity-the warrantless search would be
struck down under our existing Fourth Amendment line of decisions. This Court
would invalidate the search despite the fact Congress has a strong interest in regulat-
ing and preventing drug-related crime and has in fact pervasively regulated such
crime for a longer period of time than it has regulated mining.
452 U.S. at 608 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He nonetheless concurred in the judgment be-
cause he believed such searches constitutional under the open fields doctrine. Id. at 608-09.
123. One might argue that the New York regulation is designed to deter theft, and thus
pertains to future crime, whereas the officers in Mincey were in pursuit of information relevant
Second, the "substantial interest" in Burger fallsfar short-of that in
either Dewey or Biswell. There is nothing hazardous or inherently dan-
gerous about the situation in Burger that would outweigh Burger's pri-
vacy interest in his business, regulated though it might be. And even a
minimal privacy interest, according to Biswell, may only be outweighed
by an "urgent [governmental] interest."124
The specific evidence of the state's substantial need advanced by the
Burger Court is also unconvincing. Economic losses and above-average
insurance premiums certainly do not signify problems of urgency in the
sense the Dewey Court implied by its discussion of "hazardous" condi-
tions. In fact, the Burger rationale seems to be stacking the deck with
these reasons.
12 5
The Court also suggests that New York has an interest in curtailing
auto theft because stolen cars are used in the commission of other crimes.
The regulatory scheme at issue in Burger, however, is designed to inhibit
auto theft as a lucrative business by deterring auto dismantlers and
junkyard dealers from trafficking in stolen cars. 26 Such regulations
would likely have little if any deterrent effect on the theft of cars stolen
for the purpose of committing other crimes. 27
to a crime already committed. This logic, however, is not sound. The administrative part of
the officers' search in checking for Burger's license and police book may have been of deterrent
value, since not producing these items exposed him to felony and misdemeanor penalties, re-
spectively. But the investigators' search of the car parts in the yard was no different from any
other search for evidence of crime already committed.
The only apparent difference between the two searches is that the junkyard search was
conducted pursuant to regulation of Burger's business, whereas the search in Mincey was con-
ducted pursuant to a specific criminal investigation. No magic, however, resides in the term
"regulation." The regulation in question comprises laws designed to define and prescribe busi-
ness conduct. Criminal laws are designed to define and prescribe social conduct. Yet after
Burger, searches pursuant to a "regulatory" scheme may be conducted without a warrant,
whether or not they concern criminal behavior, while those conducted pursuant to a purely
"criminal" scheme may not.
124. 406 U.S. at 317.
125. The economic losses evidently stem from loss through theft of automobiles, and insur-
ance premiums have ostensibly risen for the same reason. Yet if this is the case, then the
public, or at least the insured public, has been compensated for its losses, except for the
amount of the increased premiums. This argument also fails to take into account other possi-
ble reasons for increased insurance premiums, such as payments for personal injury claims and
repairs resulting from accidents.
126. 107 S. Ct. at 2647.
127. Imagine, for example, a person who steals a vehicle to use as a getaway car in a
robbery. One is hard-pressed to conceive of the would-be thief stopping to weigh the vehicle's
resale potential prior to the robbery. It is much more likely that those who steal cars to com-
mit crimes rather than to resell them would abandon the cars. That cars are abandoned is
attested to by the Burger Court itself: "There are junkyards and abandoned cars in the streets
and along the countryside that are making America ugly, not beautiful." 107 S. Ct. at 2646
(citing statement of Charles M. Haar, Chairman of the White House Conference on Natural
Beauty in its Report to the President from the Panel on Automobile Junkyards).
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Finally, the Court expresses its concern regarding "a high incidence
of accidents" involving stolen automobiles. 128 No doubt accidents do oc-
cur in stolen automobiles, but they also occur at an alarming rate in
automobiles that are not stolen. The Court does not address the question
whether some causal link exists between the theft of the automobile and
any accident in which it might be involved. Moreover, it is questionable
whether a reduction in the number of stolen cars in New York would
curtail the number of accidents that occur on that state's autoways.
It is not clear, with the possible exception of high insurance premi-
ums, that any of the problems identified by the Court as contributing to
New York's interest in eradicating auto theft are caused by auto theft
and would be eradicated if auto theft were stopped or severely curtailed.
Even in the case of high insurance premiums, a state with the population
and urban centers of New York no doubt faces higher-than-average auto
insurance premiums by virtue alone of its high concentration of drivers
in urban areas, the question of theft aside.
Thus whether New York has even a substantial interest, much less
an urgent one, becomes suspect. The important question, however, re-
mains: By what criteria should the interest be measured, since the label
"substantial" clearly does not dispose of the issue? Biswell and Dewey set
up a balancing test that considers governmental interests defined by ma-
jor public health and safety concerns, whereas the interests in Burger are
economic.129
2. The Statute as a Constitutionally Adequate Substitute for a Warrant
Citing Dewey, the Court in Burger asserts that the inspection scheme
under the New York statute provides a "constitutionally adequate substi-
tute for a warrant."130 As applied in Burger, however, the Dewey tests
for constitutionality leave the business operator completely vulnerable.
The "regular basis" of section 415-a5 fails to provide neutral grounds for
entry because the decision regarding which vehicle dismantlers to inspect
and how often is left to the discretion of inspecting officers. The scope of
inspections is so broadly defined that the statute authorizes warrantless
criminal searches as well as administrative inspections. And under the
New York scheme, if an operator does have legitimate special privacy
128. 107 S. Ct. at 2647.
129. Of the cases relied on in Burger, Colonnade is the only one in which, as in Burger, the
government's interest did not concern health and safety. Colonnade was also decided on an
economic question, but it can be distinguished on several grounds. First, Colonnade did not
employ a balancing of the government's interest against the individual's privacy interest; it
rested solely on the power of Congress "[to protect] the revenue against various types of
fraud." 397 U.S. at 75. Second, it relied exclusively on the long tradition of close governmen-
tal regulation in the liquor industry. Id. Third, it held that absent consent a warrantless
search was inappropriate when a civil fine was imposed for refusal. Id. at 74.
130. 107 S. Ct. at 2648.
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concerns, he or she has no opportunity to voice them before an intrusion
takes place.
a. The Regular Basis Test
First, the Court notes, "The statute informs the operator of a vehicle
dismantling business that inspections will be made on a regular basis." 31
Burger's "regular basis," however, is a mere label, lacking the substantive
safeguards offered by the "regular basis" test of Dewey. To begin with,
section 415-a5 provides only that the vehicle dismantler shall permit in-
spection "[u]pon request of an agent... during his regular and usual
business hours .... ,,132 The statute thus provides no regularity: it per-
mits inspections but does not require them; they may be conducted at
any time during the dismantler's business hours. Practically speaking,
the vehicle dismantler has no "real expectation that his property will
from time to time be inspected by government officials." 1 33
In response to the allegation that section 415-a5 is unconstitutional
because it fails to limit the number of searches that may be conducted of
a particular business in a given time period, the Court noted that while
such limitations may be a factor, they "are not determinative of the result
so long as the statute, as a whole, places adequate limits upon the discre-
tion of the inspecting officers."134 This point is well taken. A good ex-
ample of such limits is offered by the inspection scheme under MSHA,
which requires inspections of all mines at least a given number of times
in a given period. 135 While the MSHA scheme is not perfectly predict-
able, it passes muster because it establishes a frame of reference by setting
a minimum number of searches in a given period. Even though the
scheme imposes no maximum, it nonetheless limits discretion; the mini-
mum number of searches specified by the statute provides a guideline
against which any abuse might be measured. Whatever protection the
predictability argument offers, however, is belied by its application in
Burger to section 415-a5, pursuant to which the only basis for a search is
an agent's request, conferring nearly unbridled discretion on the investi-
gating officer and leaving open the potential for abuse.
b. Standards for Compliance
Echoing the Dewey Court regarding standards for compliance, the
Burger Court asserted that section 415-a5 "sets forth the scope of the
inspection and, accordingly, places the operator on notice as to how to
131. Id. (citing Dewey, 452 U.S. at 605) (emphasis added).
132. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986).
133. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 599 (emphasis added); see Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323.
134. 107 S. Ct. at 2648 n.21.
135. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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comply with the statute."'13 6 The Court found inspections under the
New York scheme constitutional because officers may conduct inspec-
tions only during regular and usual business hours, inspections can be
made only of vehicle dismantling and related industries, and the permis-
sible scope of searches is narrowly defined: officers may inspect records
plus any vehicles or parts of vehicles subject to the record-keeping re-
quirements.' 37 These findings demonstrate how loosely the Burger Court
applied the Dewey criteria: rather than serving as a limiting provision,
section 415-a5 permits inspections of the broadest possible scope.
Limiting inspections to normal business hours does not limit the
scope of the inspection, although such a provision may render the inspec-
tion less intrusive. Likewise, the limitation of inspections to the vehicle-
dismantling industry does not limit the scope of inspections within the
industry. On the contrary, section 415-a5 permits an "agent or police
officer to examine [records] and any vehicles or parts of vehicles which
are subject to the record keeping requirements of this section and which
are on the premises."' 3 This provision does not even limit the inspec-
tion to the administrative task of comparing the vehicle parts on the
premises with the operator's records; it allows "inspection" of any vehi-
cle parts on the premises "subject to the record keeping requirements."
The statute thus allows the police to conduct a full-scale nonadministra-
tive warrantless criminal search that circumvents all the requirements of
the Warrant Clause. New York's statutory scheme amounts in effect to a
general warrant.' 39
The argument that obtaining a license under the statute's require-
ment puts the operator on notice of the standards for compliance fails to
render the inspection scheme constitutional. Obtaining a license indi-
cates neither that the operator has impliedly consented to the search nor
that because he is "on notice" he has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.' 4 Moreover, on facts such as those in Burger when the operator
has no license, notice arguments become inapplicable. And if the opera-
tor has no records, inspecting officers cannot compare vehicle parts with
records to verify whether or not the operator is in compliance with the
statute.
The Court found section 415-a5 constitutional in part because "it
notifies the operator as to who is authorized to conduct an inspection."'141
Yet informing the operator of who is authorized to search and limiting
that inspector's discretion are two different tasks. Under section 415-a5
136. 107 S. Ct. at 2648.
137. Id.
138. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5(a) (McKinney 1986).
139. See supra note 17.
140. See supra note 36.
141. 107 S. Ct. at 2648.
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inspections are routinely conducted by New York City police officers.1 42
This fact in itself would not make the inspections unconstitutional if the
statute defined narrowly enough the scope of the inspections and cur-
tailed the discretion of the inspecting officers.
Discretion is not curtailed under section 415-a5, however, since it
allows searches "upon request." Furthermore, this scheme fails to re-
strict the searches to administrative inspections. Indeed, the New York
City Charter explicitly authorizes searches to be undertaken "in connec-
tion with the performance of any police duties."143 This provision en-
courages abuse, since police are normally interested in crime detection,
and this scheme allows searches for criminal evidence on less than even a
suspicion. Officers may thus circumvent the probable cause and warrant
requirements for criminal searches at any time during business hours by
simply asserting they are conducting an "administrative" search.1"
The New York inspection statute is unnecessarily and unconstitu-
tionally broad. It allows inspections at the discretion of police officers.
It also allows inspection of vehicle parts even if the operator produces
neither a license nor a record book.145 Under 415-al the failure of a
vehicle dismantler to register pursuant to the statute is a felony; the fail-
ure to register by salvage pools, mobile car crushers, and itinerant vehicle
collectors is a misdemeanor. Thus warrantless searches are unnecessary
to achieve the statute's administrative purpose because noncompliance
with the administrative regulations carries its own penalties, and nothing
prevents officers from making an arrest on those grounds and returning
with a warrant to continue their search for stolen vehicles or vehicle
parts. If the owner were the only operator, no risk would arise that evi-
dence would be destroyed during their absence, since the operator would
be in custody. If a partner or co-worker were present, the premises could
142. Id. at 2634.
143. Naw YORK CrTY CHARTER § 436 (Supp. 1985).
144. The dissent notes:
This case... does not present the more difficult question whether a state could take
any criminal conduct, make it an administrative violation, and then search without
probable cause for violations of the newly created administrative rule. The increas-
ing overlap of administrative and criminal violations creates an obvious temptation
for the state to do so, and plainly toleration of this type of pretextual search would
allow an end-run around the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
107 S. Ct. at 2657 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Certainly this sort of temptation was present,
and there is no evidence that it was not yielded to in this case.
145. Justice Brennan observed that as soon as agents learned Burger possessed neither a
license nor a police book, the search became one for criminal evidence and ceased to serve any
administrative purpose: "There is no administrative provision forbidding possession of stolen
automobiles or automobile parts. The inspection became a search for evidence of criminal acts
when all possible administrative violations had been uncovered." 107 S. Ct. at 2656 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). He noted that if Burger had been registered, an administra-
tive sanction-revocation of his license for illegal possession of stolen vehicles or vehicle
parts--would have been available. Id. at 2656 n.14.
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be secured while officers sought a warrant. Such a requirement would
not unduly burden the government. In any case, as the dissent notes,
"inconvenience alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason
for abrogating the warrant requirement." 1 6
c. Special Privacy Concerns
The Dewey Court noted that under MSHA, inspecting agents were
prohibited from forcing entry. The government's ensuing proceeding for
an injunction against future refusals provided the mine owner with a fo-
rum for showing that a particular inspection falls outside the regulatory
authority or for seeking accommodation of any special privacy interests.
This is not the case with the New York inspection scheme at issue in
Burger; no such protective mechanism is there provided. Moreover, re-
fusal to allow the search is punishable by up to thirty days' imprisonment
or a fine of up to fifty dollars or both.147 Refusal to comply with the
regulations or to permit a search is a felony or misdemeanor punishable
by criminal penalties, loss of license, or civil fines."4 '
Far from protecting a citizen against unwarranted governmental in-
trusion, the New York statute encourages it. Section 415-a5 authorizes a
New York City police officer to single out a vehicle dismantler or junk
yard dealer and put him out of business, either by harassing him with
constant inspections or by arresting him for refusing an inspection. It
authorizes police who lack probable cause to conduct warrantless
searches of vehicle dismantlers at any time during business hours. 149
Even if the dealer legitimately believed that an officer was exceeding the
authority conferred by the statute, he could not refuse the search without
risking arrest or a fine.
IV. Proposed Standards
According to both Dewey and Burger, a warrantless inspection
scheme must meet three tests for constitutionality: a business is perva-
sively regulated and a warrant requirement would frustrate the regula-
tory scheme, a substantial governmental interest outweighs individual
privacy interests, and the statutory scheme provides a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant. The wide disparity of results in two
cases ostensibly applying the same tests proves the need for stricter appli-
cation of the standards. Courts must give more than lip service to these
146. 107 S. Ct. at 2657 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 283 (Powell, J. concurring)).
147. NEw YORK CiY CHARTER § 436 (Supp. 1985).
148. N.Y. VEH. & T1AF. LAW § 415-al, 5, 6 (McKinney 1986).
149. I do not suggest that a New York City police officer would choose to abuse a business
operator in these ways, but to the extent the statute permits such abuse, even if it does not
contemplate it, the statute exceeds constitutional bounds.
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requirements to preserve the constitutional protections of the Fourth
Amendment.
A. A Warrant Requirement Would Frustrate the Regulatory Scheme
If a search is not consensual, 50 the first question is whether the no-
tice normally attending an administrative warrant would frustrate the
regulatory scheme. If it would, because of the need for surprise inspec-
tions, then warrants issued ex parte ought to be considered.
Indeed, the "need to conduct frequent searches""15 is too broad a
determination to provide either a constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant or a reason for dispensing with it. The term "frequent," far
from a specific mandate, permits the broadest interpretation. The statute
at issue in Burger, for example, which failed to articulate the meaning of
the term, conferred nearly unbridled discretion on the inspecting officers,
who could search as often, or as seldom, as they chose.
52
The need under MSHA to conduct searches every five, ten, or fifteen
days of mining operations that generate explosive gases might constitute
the sort of frequency that would make a strong case for dispensing with a
warrant. Moreover, extreme health and safety concerns lend urgency to
the need for such frequency. But the simple fact that searches are to be
conducted monthly, quarterly, or biannually fails to argue persuasively
for warrantless inspections. It is difficult to see how the need to obtain a
warrant at these latter intervals would frustrate a regulatory scheme.
In none of the cases discussed above did the Court make a persua-
sive argument regarding why an ex parte warrant would not suffice.
Even if the effectiveness of an inspection scheme demands that the notice
protection be sacrificed, at the very least, an administrative warrant
would provide the business operator with a neutral magistrate's determi-
nation that the search was in order, thus safeguarding the protections
called for in Camara, See, and Barlow's. Moreover, issued ex parte, a
warrant would pose no threat to the surprise deemed necessary for effec-
tive enforcement of the regulatory scheme.
B. The Balancing Test
If a balancing test is to be substituted for probable cause, the govern-
mental/public interest must outweigh the privacy interest at stake. This
balancing should require more than allowing a court or a legislature to
say that if a business is pervasively regulated, the owner/operator has no
reasonable expectation of privacy. As Justice Stewart noted in his dissent
in Dewey: "I would have supposed that the mandates of the Fourth
150. See supra note 3.
151. Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2648.
152. Under section 415-a5 an inspection may be conducted "[u]pon request... during...
regular and usual business hours .... " N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986).
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Amendment demand heightened, not lowered, respect, as the intrusive
regulatory authority of government expands."'
1 53
In both Dewey and Biswell, the government's interest in conducting
the search was measured by concern for the public health and safety.'" 4
This rationale, akin to that of exigent circumstances,' 55 allows a warrant-
less search only when the immediate safety of the investigating officer or
the public is at stake. While the Court in Dewey did not use the term
"exigent circumstances" in defining its balancing test, the inherent dan-
ger of the mining industry was nonetheless at the core of its reasoning,
just as the danger inherent in apprehending an armed suspect gave rise to
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the
Terry line of cases.' 5
6
The Terry Court, relying on Camara's "lesser invasion" balancing
standard, first suggested that the stop-and-frisk was justified on the no-
tion that it constituted only a "minor inconvenience and petty indignity,"
which was properly imposed in the interest of effective law enforce-
ment.'57 At a later point in the opinion the Court did recognize a stop-
and-frisk as a significant intrusion on personal privacy but found it none-
153. 452 U.S. at 612 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
154. In Biswell the government characterized its interest in conducting a forcible, warrant-
less search for illegal firearms as necessary "to prevent violent crime." 406 U.S. at 315.
155. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), allowing a warrantless search of a criminal
suspect's outer clothing to discover the existence of weapons, which would pose a significant
threat to the safety of the investigating officer and others. The search is allowed when the
officer is reasonably justified in believing the suspect "armed and presently dangerous."
156. Looking at the issue from an exigent circumstances standpoint, it is questionable
whether the distinction between levels of probable cause necessary for administrative versus
criminal searches is a valid one. In allowing administrative warrants to issue on less than
probable cause, the Camara Court offered the rationale that administrative searches are not
searches for criminal evidence and are thus minimally intrusive. Yet apropos of a criminal
search, the Court in Terry relies on the Camara definition of balancing without raising the
issue whether a distinction between administrative and criminal searches should be made.
Certainly, the Burger decision leaves no doubt that the Court no longer finds this distinction
compelling. See supra pp. 278-88.
I find no inherent logical difficulty in doing away with the distinction between civil and
criminal searches; on the contrary, the Fourth Amendment makes no such distinction. Fur-
thermore, the sort of tests applied in both Biswell and Dewey suggest that if any warrantless
search is to be conducted, some urgent need is required to overcome the individual's privacy
interest.
The problem with proceeding along the lines of Burger, however, is that it allows entry for
nonconsensual searches on less than probable cause, in the absence of either exigent circum-
stances or any other bona fide exception to the warrant requirement. This significantly erodes
explicit protections of the Fourth Amendment, which requires that searches be conducted
pursuant to a warrant issued on probable cause. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
157. Terry 392 U.S. at 10 (citing People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 447, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36,
252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (1964), cert denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965)). This argument might be
persuasive in the case of the criminal who will later face the even greater indignities of arrest,
detention, and trial, but it is not convincing in the case of an innocent individual. This would
no doubt be a highly intrusive and humiliating experience for one who had in fact committed
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theless justified by exigent circumstances. 58 It-is -the exigent circum-
stances rationale, rather than the Camara lesser invasion theory, that
would justify a warrantless search in an administrative context, because
in the absence of some urgency, inspecting agents would have no reason
for not obtaining a warrant.
In the interest of maintaining the integrity of such a standard, the
term "urgent" rather than "substantial" would no doubt prove more ef-
fective, particularly if it were held to denote the need to prevent death or
serious physical harm. 159 As the Camara Court noted, warrantless in-
spections have traditionally been upheld in emergency situations."
Under no circumstances should the balancing test dispense with a war-
rant for the government's mere convenience or, as in Burger, to allow
agents to circumvent a warrant's requirements of probable cause, partic-
ularity, and a magistrate's neutral determination when conducting a
search for criminal evidence.
C. A Constitutionally Adequate Substitute for a Warrant
If one may contemplate a constitutionally adequate substitute for a
warrant, it follows that one may also contemplate a constitutionally ade-
quate substitute for the specific protections-and each of them-covered
by a warrant, namely probable cause, particularity, and the determina-
tion by a neutral magistrate that these requirements are met. In each
case, whether an element of the Warrant Clause is necessary, the tests
are-or ought to be-different, and the possible results of the inquiry are
several: the search requires both probable cause and a warrant;16 1 it may
be conducted on less than probable cause but requires a warrant;1 6 2 the
search requires probable cause but may be conducted without a war-
rant;,1 63 or it may be conducted on less than probable cause and without a
no wrong, especially, for example, if the search were conducted in front of acquaintances or
friends.
158. 392 U.S. at 26-27.
159. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Burger: "The Court should require a warrant for
inspections in closely regulated industries unless the inspection scheme furthers an urgent gov-
ernmental interest. See Dewey [and] Biswell.... ." 107 S. Ct. at 2654 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
160. These include the seizure of unwholesome food, North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City
of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908); compulsory smallpox vaccination, Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); health quarantine, Compagnie Franoaise de Navigation i Vapeur v.
Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); summary destruction of tubercular cattle,
Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929).
161. These include any search conducted not subject to a bona fide exception.
162. This is the case with typical administrative searches, such as those outlined in both
Camara, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See, 387 U.S. 544 (1967). See supra pp. 266-67.
163. These include searches of automobiles. See, eg., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970) (if an officer has probable cause to stop a vehicle on the highway, no warrant is neces-
sary to search the vehicle or seize items of contraband); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
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warrant.164
In all cases, whether or not a warrant is required, limits on the scope
of the search must be narrowly drawn in order to satisfy the particularity
requirement. To require specific substitutes for the different elements
would protect the integrity of the safeguards guaranteed by the Warrant
Clause and insure that any search is reasonable by constitutional
standards.
1. The Regular Basis Test: Administrative Probable Cause
In the context of administrative searches of pervasively regulated
businesses, the Court has typically attempted to provide substitutes for
the particularity requirement, even though it may not have labeled them
as such 165 and even though the "substitutes" may or may not have been
constitutionally adequate. Regarding probable cause, however, the situa-
tion has been different. In cases such as Camara and See in which a
warrant is required but probable cause is not, the Court has addressed
the issue of a probable cause equivalent. 166
In the context of warrantless searches of pervasively regulated busi-
nesses the Court has typically ignored the question of probable cause or a
probable cause substitute. When warrantless searches are permitted, the
need for specific attention to probable cause or its equivalent-that is,
grounds for entry, as opposed to the need for a warrant-is especially
great in order to prevent abuse of regulatory power and should be man-
dated according to specific criteria.
Criteria for selecting which businesses to search and how often to
search them should be "derived from neutral sources." 16 7 This means
that when a disinterested judgment regarding grounds for entry (usually
probable cause) is not supplied by a neutral magistrate, the statutory
scheme should be drawn specifically and narrowly enough to guarantee
that these determinations will not be made arbitrarily or at the discretion
of any inspecting agent. A good example of such neutral criteria is the
inspection scheme under MSHA, at issue in Dewey, whereby all mines
must be inspected a minimum number of times within a given period.
This fixed frequency, inherent in Dewey's regular basis test, supplies the
neutrality that would otherwise be provided by a magistrate.
(1982) (when not targeting a specific container, agents can search anywhere in the vehicle
where the object sought reasonably might be).
164. These include routine airport searches and stop-and-frisk searches such as that at is-
sue in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
165. See Burger, 107 S. Ct. at 2648; Dewey, 452 U.S. at 604, 605; Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 323.
166. Camara, 387 U.S. at 538; See, 387 U.S. at 545; Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 320-21.
167. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321.
THE "ADMINISTRATIVE" SEARCH
2. The Scope of the Search
It is essential with a statutory scheme that purports to substitute for
the privacy protections of a warrant that the scope of inspections under
the scheme be specifically and narrowly defined. Otherwise the statute
becomes in effect a general warrant. An administrative statute should
authorize warrantless inspections only insofar as they serve an adminis-
trative purpose, and agents should be required to obtain a warrant at any
point when the inspection ceases to serve that purpose.
That the line is finely drawn between administrative and criminal
searches as it is in the case of vehicle dismantlers should not prevent
inspecting agents and courts from respecting the distinction. The Burger
Court found that a state may "address a major social problem both by
way of an administrative scheme and through penal sanctions." ''  Used
to legitimate a warrantless criminal search under the umbrella of an ad-
ministrative regulatory scheme, this rationale is not compelling. The
Court has traditionally had no problem drawing such fine distinctions,
even when the purposes of the inspection might seem logically to
overlap. 169
3. Special Privacy Accommodations
Under a scheme such as that of MSHA, the need for a warrant be-
comes moot, since the statute provides greater protections than a warrant
would by allowing a mine operator to refuse a search when he feels spe-
cial privacy concerns are at stake. Since the warrant itself meets the
standard of the Fourth Amendment, a scheme offering greater protection
than a warrant would more than meet the constitutional standard. Such
a greater-than-or-equal-to approach is necessary when considering sub-
stitutes for constitutional standards; "substitute" protections cannot by
definition be constitutionally adequate if they offer lesser safeguards than
those the Constitution dictates. The degree of protection offered by such
168. 107 S. Ct. at 2649 (emphasis in original).
169. In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), a case involving a fire investigation, the
Court held under an exigent circumstances rationale that fire fighters may enter without a
warrant to battle a fire, and they may remain after the fire is out for a reasonable time to
determine the cause and origin of the fire. Id. at 510. Thereafter, however, unless the premises
are so far damaged that no privacy interest remains, entry may be gained only by consent,
exigent circumstances, or a warrant based "on a showing of probable cause to believe that
relevant evidence will be found in the place to be searched." Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S.
287, 294 (1984).
In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), after a shootout at Mincey's home, under-
cover agents made a warrantless entry on grounds of exigent circumstances to search for in-
jured persons. The warrantless entry less than ten minutes later by homicide detectives was
held unconstitutional. The Court remarked that a "warrantless search must be 'strictly cir-
cumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation."' Id. at 393 (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)).
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a statutory provision, however, would depend on whether the
owner/operator actually knew of his right to refuse the search.
Conclusion
The integrity of the Constitution demands that its guarantees be
more than paper provisions. If the Fourth Amendment has outlived its
usefulness because it impedes law enforcement to such an extent that the
situation poses a serious threat to the public well-being, then this is a
matter for congressional action, with the public support of the nation at
large. It is certainly no task for the New York legislature. Neither is it a
question for unilateral determination by the judiciary.
Such action would belie LaFave's assertion that ours is a nation
"committed to a philosophy of tolerating a certain level of undetected
crime as preferable to an oppressive police state." 170 It would also pa-
tently contravene "the aims of a free and open society" '171 the Fourth
Amendment was meant to preserve. Crime is a social evil. But the
Court, in its support of law enforcement, must not yield to the tempta-
tion to eradicate crime at the expense of personal rights and freedoms.
The Fourth Amendment certainly has not outlived its usefulness.
On the contrary, as governmental regulations expand, it is ever more
important that the constitutional protections accorded the citizen not be
diminished. The Bill of Rights and the freedoms from governmental in-
terference it accords the individual are the foundation on which our na-
tion was raised..
The whole notion of a substitute for any express constitutional pro-
vision is suspect because it threatens those freedoms. If, however, such a
substitute is to be "constitutionally adequate," it must offer protections
greater than or equal to those offered by the Constitution; it must not
erode or sacrifice as negligible protections or freedoms thereby granted.
The power to conduct a search like the one at issue in Burger-one that
allows the police to conduct warrantless inspections of a person's records
and merchandise on less than probable cause for the purpose of uncover-
ing criminal evidence-is precisely the type of blanket governmental
power the Revolution was fought against. This is precisely the type of
arbitrary governmental interference the Fourth Amendment was formu-
lated to prohibit.1 72
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